We prove an equilibrium existence result for vector functions defined on noncompact domain and we give some applications in optimization and Nash equilibrium in noncooperative game.
Introduction
Let X be a subset of a vector space E and f : X × X → R, with f x, x 0. It is well known in the literature that a point x satisfying the property: f x, y ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ X, 1.1 is called an equilibrium point. This notion of equilibrium plays an important role in various areas such as optimization, variational inequalities, and Nash equilibrium problems. We recall that an equilibrium point in this formulation was first introduced and studied by Blum and Oettli 1 , who, inspired by the very known work of Allen 2 and of Fan 3 , proved the existence of an equilibrium point by using some hypothesis concerning continuity, convexity, compactness, and monotonicity.
Recently, many authors have investigated the existence of such equilibrium points in different context. In some references, different generalizations of monotonicity condition are used to prove the existence of equilibrium see, e.g., 4-6 ; while some other references studied this equilibrium problem under generalized convexity condition see, e.g., 5 . The main objective of our work is to study this equilibrium problem by using a generalized coercivity-type condition.
In Section 3 of this paper, we prove the existence of equilibrium points when X is a noncompact subset of a Hausdorff real-topological vector space and f is a vector function that takes its values in another Hausdorff real topological vector space. The order on Y will be defined by a cone C. Formally, we obtain the existence of a point x ∈ X, which will be called a weak equilibrium point, that satisfies the following condition:
where int C denotes the interior of the cone C in Y .
The existence of what we refer to as equilibrium point, x ∈ X satisfying the following condition:
is then deduced. The results that we obtain in this section generalize the corresponding results obtained in the classical formulation by Fan in 3, 7 , Blum and Oettli in 1 as well as the corresponding results obtained in noncompact case by Tan and Tinh in 8 .
In Section 4 and as applications, we prove the existence of saddle points for vector functions defined on noncompact domain. We also prove the existence of Nash equilibrium for an infinite set of players game in which every player has a noncompact strategy set and vector loss function.
Preliminaries
In this section, we will recall some notions, definitions, and some properties from the literature that will be used in the paper. Let E and Y be real Hausdorff topological vector spaces. Let X ⊂ E be a nonempty closed convex subset and C ⊂ Y a pointed convex closed cone. The cone C can define a partial order on Y , denoted by , as follows: x y if and only if y − x ∈ C. We will write x ≺ y if and only if y − x ∈ int C, in the case int C / ∅.
We say that the cone C satisfies condition * if there is a pointed convex closed cone
Let f : X → Y be a mapping. f is said to be convex resp., concave with respect to C if for all x, y ∈ X and α ∈ 0, 1 , the following condition is satisfied:
It is clear that if C 1 and C 2 are two convex closed cones in Y with C 1 ⊆ C 2 and f is convex resp., concave with respect to C 1 , then f is also convex resp., concave with respect to C 2 .
The mapping f is said to be lower semicontinuous, in brief l.s.c. resp., upper semicontinuous, in brief u.s.c. , at x 0 with respect to C if for any neighborhood V of f x 0 in Y , there exists a neighborhood U of x 0 in X such that
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Note that following Lemma 2.11 in 8 , if f is l.s.c. with respect to C, then the set F {x ∈ X : f x / ∈ C} is closed. The mapping f is said to be continuous with respect to C at a point x 0 in X if it is l.s.c. and u.s.c. with respect to C at this point.
The mapping f is said to be monotone with respect to C if for all x, y ∈ X, the following condition is satisfied:
In this paper, we will use the definition of coercing family borrowed from 9 .
Definition 2.1. Consider a subset X of a topological vector space and a topological space Y . A family { C i , K i } i∈I of pair of sets is said to be coercing for a set-valued map F : X → Y if and only if the following hold.
i For each i ∈ I, C i is contained in a compact convex subset of X and K i is a compact subset of Y .
ii For each i, j ∈ I, there exists
Remark 2.2. Definition 2.1 can be reformulated by using the "dual" set-valued map
} i∈I is coercing for F if and only if it satisfies conditions i , ii of Definition 2.1 and the following one:
Note that in case where the family is reduced to one element, condition iii of Definition 2.1 and in the sense of Remark 2.2 appeared first in this generality with two sets K and C in 10 and generalizes condition of Karamardian 11 and Allen 2 . Condition iii is also an extension of the coercivity condition given by Fan 7 . For other examples of set-valued maps admitting a coercing family that is not necessarily reduced to one element, see 9 .
The following generalization of KKM principle obtained in 9 will be used in the proof of the main result of this paper.
Proposition 2.3. Let E be a Hausdorff topological vector space, Y a convex subset of E, X a nonempty subset of Y , and F : X → Y a KKM map with compactly closed values in Y (i.e., for all
x ∈ X, F x ∩ C is closed for every compact set C of Y ). If F admits a coercing family, then x∈X F x / φ.
The Main Result
The main result of this paper is the following equilibrium theorem for vector valued maps. 
g x, x
0 for all x ∈ X.
4 For any fixed y ∈ X, the function g ·, y : X → Y is u.s.c. with respect to C on X.
5 For any fixed x ∈ X, the function g x, · : X → Y is convex.
6 There exists a family { C i , K i } i∈I satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) of Definition 2.1 and the following one: For each i ∈ I, there exists k ∈ I such that
Then, there exists a point x ∈ X such that:
Proof. For any y ∈ X, we consider the set-valued map:
We have the following. i For all y ∈ X, F y is closed in X, then F has compactly closed values. ii Let {y i : i ∈ I} be a finite subset of X and z ∈ conv{y i : i ∈ I}. We want to show that conv y i : i ∈ I ⊂ i∈I F y i .
3.4
By absurdity, suppose that z i∈I λ i y i with λ i ≥ 0, i∈I λ i 1 and z / ∈ i∈I F y i , it means that for all i ∈ I, f y i , z − g z, y i ∈ int C, i∈I λ i f y i , z − g z, y i ∈ int C, ∀i ∈ I.
3. Take x in this intersection, then f y, x − g x, y / ∈ int C, for all y ∈ X. b For any fixed x, y ∈ X, the function k : t ∈ 0, 1 → f ty 1 − t x, y is u.s.c. with respect to C at t 0.
Then, there exists a point x ∈ X such that f x, y g x, y / ∈ − int C, ∀y ∈ X.
3.13
In addition, if C satisfies condition (
Proof. By Theorem 3.1, there exists x ∈ X with f y, x − g x, y / ∈ int C, ∀y ∈ X.
3.15
Since x ∈ K, by applying Lemma 3.3 in 8 , we obtain f x, y g x, y / ∈ − int C, ∀y ∈ X.
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This proves the first assertion of Corollary 3.2. Now, let C satisfy condition * and let C be a pointed convex closed cone in Y such that C \ {0} ⊂ int C. It is easy to see that X, C, { C i , K i } i∈I , f, and g satisfy all assumptions of Theorem 3.1, by the first assertion, we have f x, y g x, y / ∈ − int C, ∀y ∈ X.
3.17
Since − C \ {0} ⊂ − int C, it follows that f x, y g x, y / ∈ − C \ {0} , ∀y ∈ X.
3.18
Let K be a convex subset of X. The core of K relative to X, denoted by core X K, is the set defined by a ∈ core X K if and only if a ∈ K and K ∩ a, y / ∅ for all y ∈ X \ K, where a, y {x ∈ E : x λa 1 − λ y for λ ∈ 0, 1 }. The following result can be deduced from Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 3.3. Let X, C, { C i , K i } i∈I , f and g satisfy hypothesis (1-5) of Theorem 3.1 and the following condition
6 There exists a nonempty convex compact subset K of X such that, for any x ∈ K \ core X K, one can find a point y ∈ core X K such that f x, y g x, y 0.
3.19
3.20
Proof. We just prove the first assertion. By taking for all i ∈ I, C i K i K, which is a convex compact set we can see that by using hypothesis 6 that F admits a coercing family in the sense of Remark 2.2. 
Applications
Let I be a possibly infinite set of players. If each player i ∈ I has a nonempty strategy subset X i of a Hausdorff topological vector space and a loss function, f i : X i∈I X i → Y depending on the strategies of n players. For x x i i∈I ∈ X, we denote x 
holds for all y y i i∈I ∈ X. A point x x i ∈ X is said to be a Nash equilibrium if and only if for all i ∈ I,
holds for all y y i i∈I ∈ X. 
Then, there exists a weak Nash equilibrium. In addition, if C satisfies condition ( * ), then there exists a Nash equilibrium.
We can easily verify that X, { C i , K i } i∈I , f 0, and g as above satisfy all assumptions of Corollary 3.2. Applying the first part of this corollary, we conclude that there exists a point x x i∈I ∈ X with g x, y / ∈ − int C ∀y ∈ X, 4.5
Journal of Applied Mathematics
If for i ∈ I, we choose y ∈ X in such a way that x
This completes the proof of the first assertion of the proposition. The second assertion of Corollary 3.2 implies that
and this gives us the second assertion.
Let E 1 and E 2 be two Hausdorff topological vector spaces, X 1 and X 2 be two nonempty convex closed subsets of E 1 and E 2 , respectively. Let Y and C be as above and T :
A point x 1 , x 2 ∈ X 1 × X 2 is called a weak saddle point of T with respect to C if
holds for all y 1 , y 2 ∈ X 1 × X 2 . 
4.12
Apply the first part of Corollary 3.2 for g and the null function 0, we conclude that there exists a point x x 1 , x 2 ∈ X with g x, y / ∈ − int C, for all y ∈ X. This follows:
f y 1 , x 2 − f x 1 , y 2 / ∈ − int C, ∀y y 1 , y 2 ∈ X.
4.13
The second assertion of Corollary 3.2 implies that f y 1 , x 2 − f x 1 , y 2 / ∈ −C \ {0}, ∀y y 1 , y 2 ∈ X, 4.14 and this completes the proof.
